SENTINEL AI

SECURITY CONTROLS

Enforcement beyond
the prompt.

A composable local runtime for supported agent tools. Each control has an explicit scope and a testable outcome.

01

Default-deny authorization

A request is denied unless its authenticated task contract and policy authorize the operation and resource. Model confidence never substitutes for authority.

02

Signed, expiring task contracts

Trusted controllers issue task-scoped authority. Agent-generated instructions cannot modify signatures, permissions or expiration.

03

Human approvals and replay protection

Sensitive authorized operations can require a local authenticated approval. Approvals bind to the exact request and can be consumed only once. The cloud cannot issue them.

04

Revocation and audit correlation

Local task revocation stops the runtime. SQLite records decisions and execution metadata so proposals, authorization and actual execution can be distinguished.

05

Restricted execution

Simulated APIs have no production connectivity. Unix descriptor-pinned file tools and a fixed, bounded Wasm tool provide deliberately narrow execution capabilities.

06

Prompt-injection impact containment

Malicious tool content remains untrusted. Gateway restrictions still apply when a model follows hostile instructions. This is not a claim of detection or complete immunity.

07

Experimental provenance controls

Protected observations can mark a task and block subsequent sinks. This conservative research mechanism is not complete information-flow tracking.

08

Optional private telemetry

Only explicitly allowed event metadata may leave the device. Cloud outages do not change local authorization; cloud events are endpoint reports, not tamper-proof evidence.

Native Windows filesystem isolation remains disabled. WSL2 is the documented Windows alternative; native Windows compatibility is not advertised as verified.