Default-deny authorization
A request is denied unless its authenticated task contract and policy authorize the operation and resource. Model confidence never substitutes for authority.
SECURITY CONTROLS
A composable local runtime for supported agent tools. Each control has an explicit scope and a testable outcome.
A request is denied unless its authenticated task contract and policy authorize the operation and resource. Model confidence never substitutes for authority.
Trusted controllers issue task-scoped authority. Agent-generated instructions cannot modify signatures, permissions or expiration.
Sensitive authorized operations can require a local authenticated approval. Approvals bind to the exact request and can be consumed only once. The cloud cannot issue them.
Local task revocation stops the runtime. SQLite records decisions and execution metadata so proposals, authorization and actual execution can be distinguished.
Simulated APIs have no production connectivity. Unix descriptor-pinned file tools and a fixed, bounded Wasm tool provide deliberately narrow execution capabilities.
Malicious tool content remains untrusted. Gateway restrictions still apply when a model follows hostile instructions. This is not a claim of detection or complete immunity.
Protected observations can mark a task and block subsequent sinks. This conservative research mechanism is not complete information-flow tracking.
Only explicitly allowed event metadata may leave the device. Cloud outages do not change local authorization; cloud events are endpoint reports, not tamper-proof evidence.